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For a long time, European integration has been associated with the so-called Community method. This method implied the transfer of powers from the Member States to the EU level, the central role of a supranational organ in the preparation of EU policies, the possibility of QMV and the adoption of binding rules (Dehousse 2002). However, new evolutions and the expanded scope of European integration enforced more flexibility upon European decision-making. The quest for new possible governance modes besides the traditional Community method included the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). Referring to ‘new governance architecture’ (Radaelli 2003) or ‘new mode of governance’ (Scott 2002) OMC is hoped to realise further European integration. 

Several events gave rise to the creation of the OMC. Firstly Member States recognised the importance of European action in certain policy fields (employment, social policy, migration, criminal prosecution, education). However political support for the classical transfer of competences to the EU level and thus for harmonisation through traditional European legislation was difficult to gain with regard to these policy fields. Therefore a new approach of flexible and open coordination was to overcome this dilemma. (Scott 2002, 2; Heritier 2003, 105-106; Radaelli 2003, 21-22; Scharpf 2003, 99; Borras and Jacobsson 2004, 186). In addition, the ‘Social Europe’ as agreed upon in the Maastricht Social Agreement dropped behind in comparison with the ‘Monetary Europe’. Because of the complex nature of social problems, the traditional regulatory methods to compensate the loss of Member States’ autonomy were deficient to link economic and social/employment dimensions of EU policy. The introduction of the OMC was to be the solution to the imbalance between EU economic integration over social integration. (Goetschy 2003, 7; Radaelli 2003, 21; Scharpf 2003,111-115; Borras and Jacobsson 2004, 186). Finally the legitimacy crisis in the Union generated the opportunity to create a new governance tool by which the input of the decision-making process was ascertained by more and democratic actors. In addition, the output of the decision-making system was to be much more effective and efficient, by realising a European model of social policy. (Commissie 2001; Goetschy 2003, 10; Radaelli 2003, 7; Borras and Jacobsson 2004, 186-187; Schäfer 2004)

Particularly, the legitimacy angle will be the focus of this article. OMC as a new governance instrument should be considered legitimate and can therefore possible contribute to the overall legitimacy of the EU. In other words, arising from a EU legitimacy crisis, is the OMC really the expected legitimacy enhancing instrument? Or is it a legitimacy problem in itself? In the following paragraphs, the concepts of input and output legitimacy are elaborated upon and OMC, specifically EES, is assessed for both its input and output legitimacy and for its possible contributions to the overall legitimacy of the EU.  

The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and the European Employment Strategy (EES)

The OMC, as it was introduced into the Lisbon Summit Conclusions in 2000, originated already in the Luxemburg process with the European Employment Strategy (EES), formally designed in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). In fact, the principle of OMC was already introduced in the Maastricht Treaty (art 98-104 TEC) for the purpose of coordinating national economic policies through Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) (Rodriguez 2001; Scharpf 2003, 116; Borras and Jacobsson 2004; Zeitlin 2005; Zeitlin forthcoming 2005). The OMC is a rather flexible and open regulatory method contrasting with the traditional Community method by means of its non-compulsory character of rules and the plurality of involved actors. (Dehousse 2002; Goetschy 2003, 5; Borras and Jacobsson 2004). In addition, the OMC strives to keep competences at the national level, whenever possible. (Borras 2004, 197) Nevertheless, the OMC is intended to be complementary to the already existing instruments at the EU level, i.e. legislation, collective agreements, social dialogue, structural funds, etc. (Goetschy 2003, 6; Goetschy 2003, 79). Vandenbroucke has described OMC ‘as a mutual feedback process of planning, examination, comparison and adjustment of the …policies of Member States, all of this on the basis of common objectives’ (Vandenbroucke 2002)

The Lisbon Council provided the characteristics for the OMC. The OMC which is ‘designed to help Member States to progressively develop their own policies involves:
	Fixing guidelines for the Union with specific timetables for achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms;
	Establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means of comparing best practices;
	Translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional differences; 
	Periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning process.‘
(Lisbon Summit conclusions, 2000, par 37)

The OMC is often described as the ‘third way’, which stands midway between the more closed and rigid Community method and the less ambitious and less structured intergovernmental cooperation (Dehousse 2002; Zeitlin 2005). In stead, open and flexible coordination relies on joint policy definition, target development and the publishing of scoreboards of national performance (Zeitlin 2005). Voluntary accords are able to adjust quickly to changing technical and economic and social circumstances. Through the self-regulation of private actors, or co-regulation if there are public and private partners involved, it is hoped to generate solutions which are appropriate to the complex nature of the problem (Heritier 2003, 103). The OMC is used in several policy fields (employment, social inclusion, pensions, health care, education and training) with an eye on the accomplishment of the accelerated transition to ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy’ (Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 2000, par 5). In reality, OMC procedures differ greatly in these various policy fields with regard to their ambitions, functioning modes and legal bases (de la Porte and Pochet 2002, 47; Goetschy 2003, 6). As Vandenbroucke compares OMC with ‘a cookbook with various recipes, some lighter and others heavier’ (Vandenbroucke 2001, 4). 

Because of the non-compulsory character of rules, the OMC is easily denoted as ‘soft law’. Although OMC originates within the traditional soft law, characterised by collective recommendations, review, monitoring and benchmarking, some specific differences exist between both (Error! Reference source not found.). Borras and Jacobsson argue that OMC, contrary to soft law, is a political rather than a legal process. (Borras and Jacobsson 2004, 188). Therefore Jacobsson prefers to refer to the OMC as ‘soft governance’ instead of ‘soft law’ (Trubek 2005).

The relative newness of the OMC makes the assessment of the merits of OMC, including its contribution to the legitimacy of the EU, problematic. Radaelli states that because of the empirical deficit the evaluation of the OMC as government tool is difficult (Radaelli 2003). Zeitlin adds that there is a very limited range of often outdated evidence to assess the OMC and that the generalisation of the OMC merits poses problems. The variety of distinct OMC processes leads to horizontal (different policy domains) and vertical complexity (Member State, Regional, local level). In addition, also methodological difficulties are encountered since the sources of policy change can not merely be attributed to the OMC. ‘The growing political salience, proliferation and variety of OMC processes has elicited a bewildering array of contradictory assessments from both academic researchers and EU policy actors alike’ (Zeitlin 2005, 4)





This article revolves around the question whether the OMC and EES is a legitimate governance instrument and whether it can therefore enhance legitimacy in the EU. 

However, the concept of legitimacy is highly topical and approached from many angles. In this paper we hold to the dichotomous legitimacy concept of input and output legitimacy (Scharpf 1970; Scharpf 1999; Smismans 2004, 73), which has also been elaborated upon in different wordings by Weiler (Weiler 1991) and Beetham and Lord (Beetham and Lord 1998). ‘While both dimensions of legitimacy are generally complementary, they differ significantly in their preconditions and their implications for the legitimacy of the EU, when each is considered by itself’. (Scharpf 1999, 6) 





Input legitimacy refers to the fact that constituents attribute legitimacy to a political system if they consider to find themselves sufficiently involved in delivering ‘input’ in the decision-making procedure (Smismans 2004, 72-73). According to Scharpf input legitimacy focuses on ‘government by the people’, in which he states that political choices and procedures can be considered legitimate if and because they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the constituents (Scharpf 1999, 6). Based on these definitions, the input legitimacy debate in the EU has mainly revolved around the ‘democratic’ rhetoric, stating that the European decision-making process would be legitimate, at least from an input oriented perspective- if it was able to transform to a (national) democratic model. Mostly this implied the strive for the ‘parliamentary model’, the normative reference for organising in a democratic way (Smismans 2004, 72-73). Legitimacy means a generalized degree of trust of the addressees of these decisions towards the political system (Smismans 2004, 72). From this definition, it follows that the legitimacy of a political system is not exclusively linked to democracy and certainly not to parliamentary democracy (Jachtenfuchs 1997, 7). We argue that, since the EU can not be considered a nation state, nor are its tasks those of a nation state, input legitimacy in the EU can not simply be equated with nation state input legitimacy, i.e. parliamentary democracy. Such a statement does not imply an agreement with old and new technocratic visions of the EU (Majone 1996; Radaelli 1999). It does imply, however, that models of democracy developed in the national context cannot be easily transferred to the European Union and that a political strategy based on such a transfer would not necessarily lead to a more democratic EU and to an increase in its legitimacy (Jachtenfuchs 1997, 7). 

Input legitimacy is not clearly demarcated and a conceptual framework of analysis is hardly redundant to grasp the input legitimacy debate in the EU, which, I repeat, we consider not to be contrary to but broader than the democratic rhetoric. We have distinguished between 6 criteria (Bursens, 2005). The more these criteria are met, the more the EU can be called legitimate trough its input side: participation (Habermas 1996; Cohen and Sabel 2003; Smismans 2004), representation (Engelen and Sie Dhian Ho 2004), transparency (Habermas 1996; Dyrberg 2002), accountability/responsiveness (Habermas 1996; Arnull and Wincott 2002), delegation (Menon 2002; Menon 2003), deliberation (Joerges and Neyer 1997; Scharpf 1999; Commissie 2001; Arnull and Wincott 2002; Cohen and Sabel 2003). This list of interrelated criteria doesn’t pretend to be exhaustive. It only gives us a tool to assess OMC in terms of input legitimacy.

Participation: Citizens whose concerns and interests are affected by decision-making process should have an equal and effective opportunity to represent their interests and concerns during different stages of the decision-making process (de la Porte and Nanz 2004, 272). The more encompassing the participation of actors that are affected by the policy in a decision-making process, the higher the resulting input legitimacy (Heritier 2003, 108) 

Representation: Participation doesn’t necessarily mean the direct involvement of every citizen, rather than the representation of the interests of the affected citizens by interest organisation, civil society or democratic appointed actors like the parliaments of governmental actors (Engelen and Sie Dhian Ho 2004, 21). The better the interests and concerns of citizens are represented during the decision-making process, the more input legitimacy can be achieved. 

Transparency: Interested citizens, stakeholders and civil society organisations as well as European, national local and sub-national actors (E.G. Parliaments) should have access to all relevant information and documents in all stages of the process. In addition, there must be an active communication from the EU institutions and Member States. (Dyrberg 2002, 81; de la Porte and Nanz 2004, 272). But transparency also refers to the clearness of the decision-making process that should be relatively simple and possible to grasp by interested actors(Dyrberg 2002, 84). Transparency is an important criterion to establish input legitimacy. 

Accountability: In order to establish input legitimacy, it must be possible for interested citizens to hold the participants of the decision-making process accountable for their actions. This means that they are ‘liable to give an account or explanation of their actions and where appropriate to suffer the consequences, take the blame or undertake to put matters right if it should appear that errors have been made’ (Arnull and Wincott 2002, 2) Accountability is one of the key elements of legitimacy and ‘those who exercise public power should be answerable for the exercise of that power’ (Stewart 1992, 4). If accountability is met, the more the input legitimacy of the decision-making procedure is established. 

Delegation:  The delegation of power and competences to the European level is settled by the subsidiarity principle. The subsidiarity principle is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks are made as to whether action at Community level is justified in the light of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the Union does not take action (except in the areas which fall within its exclusive competence) unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level. It is closely bound up with the principle of proportionality. Only if subsidiarity is respected, delegation can be considered legitimate. 

The reason why delegation is issued can be motivated by the ‘political transaction cost’ theory (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999) and/or by the ‘principal agent theory’. The former argues that delegation is used to reduce the political transaction costs of decision-making and implementation, which arise from discussions and negotiations between political actors (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999, 44). The latter states that the principal agent has no sufficient expertise, information and/or time to deal with substantive issues in detail and therefore delegates tasks to other agents (Heritier 2003). 

Deliberation: Actors aim to search first for new possible solutions profitable to all, than proceeding negotiations in order to establish consensus among participants. Consensual decision making secures that minorities can not be overruled, which contribute to input legitimacy (Scharpf 1999; Heritier 2003, 108). Only those decisions, which claim to have the agreement of all citizens can be considered legitimate through the input side. 





In the dichotomous model of Scharpf, not only input legitimacy is an important aspect in the overall legitimacy of the EU, but output legitimacy is equally, if not more, important. (Scharpf 1999). Scharpf’s key point is that in at least some cases the EU can be conceived as legitimate by reference to its output, even if input legitimacy is lacking (Scharpf 1999, 11). Also other authors argue that the EU is more based on output legitimacy, given the fact that it is only a partial state and the tasks it fulfils (Smismans 2004). Output legitimacy or ‘government for the people’ (Scharpf 1999) basically connects legitimacy of a (political) system with its (perceived) performance, attributing legitimacy to a political system on its capacity to achieve the citizens’ goals (effectiveness) and to solve their problems (problem-solving capacity) (Höreth 1999).

Effectiveness: The output legitimacy of the EU refers to the acceptance that some decision or some structure of governance at the EU level ‘works’, ‘performs’, is able to ‘deliver the goods’. Functionalist and neo-functionalist theorists argue that the supranational institutions, including the EU itself, are judged by how well they perform tasks, granting more legitimacy to an institution that performs well. 

Problem-solving capacity: Output legitimacy of the EU is derived from its capacity to solve problems requiring collective solutions because they could not be solved through individual action, through market exchanges or through voluntary cooperation in civil society. 

EES, a legitimate governance instrument?

EES and input legitimacy
According to the Lisbon Conclusions, OMC is ‘an important tool to improve transparency and democratic participation’ (Council 2000: 7). There is no doubt that OMC affects the input legitimacy of the EU, both in positive and negative ways. We will evaluate EES with regard to the criteria of input legitimacy as described above: participation, transparency, representation, accountability, delegation and deliberation.

Participation
The very meaning of the concept ‘open’ in OMC, refers to ‘the Union, the Member States, the regional and local levels, as well as the social partners and civil society, will be actively involved, using varied forms of partnership’ (Council 2000, point 38). Heritier argues that by involving most of the affected public and private actors, they generate support and credibility for the policy initiative and deliver expertise and information. (Heritier 2003, 107). Thus, interest organisations and stakeholders are largely included in OMC and so in the policy formulation and negotiation. This is an important contribution to increasing input legitimacy. 

With regard to the EES, both Goetschy (Goetschy 2003) and de la Porte and Nanz (de la Porte and Nanz 2004) have assessed the participation of the above-mentioned actors during the negotiations and implementation. They conclude that although it initially is a laudable initiative to include many and different actors during negotiation and implementation, actual participation is not so prevalent. 

Participation of European labour and Management organisations has been fairly limited. (Goetschy 2003, 68). There seems to be a lack of commitment to the EES from the ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation) and a reluctance to become involved from UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers Confederation of Europe) (de la Porte and Nanz 2004, 279). Regarding to the participation of national social organisations, efforts have been made to increase participation in the EES (Trubek 2005, 52). However their actual participation is rather weak, mostly because they fail to reach agreement among themselves. Although they were involved in all Member States during the implementation of the NAP, they were only in half of the Member States consulted in drawing the NAP (de la Porte 2004, 279-280). In addition the consultation process over NAPs does not have generated new initiatives from the social partners themselves (Goetschy 2003, 67). Moreover in six Member States the satisfaction with the participation conditions was low among the social partners, underlining that the level of their participation is vulnerable to political changes (de la Porte 2004, 279-280). This way, EES remains often an purely governmental issue (Goetschy 2003, 67)

The participation of the local level actors has no legal basis in the EES. Their mandate stems from the Lisbon Council which encourages participation in OMC at all levels (European Council 2000, point 38). In most Member States the involvement of local levels reflects the dynamic that existed before the EES (de la Porte and Nanz 2004). Hence, EES has not given new stimuli for local involvement of European decision-making.

With regard to EES, the European Parliament is to be consulted, in contrast to other OMC-processes, but in practice its role is marginalised in the first five years. Due to time constraints, the EP was not able to formulate positions or opinions that could be influential. Also national and regional parliaments hardly debate EES and national parliamentarians have not enough knowledge of EES (de la Porte and Nanz 2004, 278). This is especially relevant, since EES remains largely a national issue. At the level of the Member States decisions on concrete reforms plans and on allocation of financial resources are taken (Dehousse 2002, 19), so especially national parliaments, sub-national parliaments should engage themselves in EES.

Thus, EES encourages the participation of a diversity of actors, underlining the involvement of social, sub-national and local actors in the definition and implementation of NAP. However, the assessment of the participation criterion after 5 years points out that participation takes place, but that it is fairly weakly developed. That way EES doesn’t meet its ideal description of ‘open and deliberative mode of governance’. Is OMC really that ‘open’? (Smismans 2004) The lack of effective participation can lead to a ‘social legitimacy deficit’ in contrast to the openness announced by OMC (Telo 2003, 138). This puts the input legitimacy of EES and OMC in perspective. The more encompassing the participation of actors that are affected by a policy in the decision-making process, the higher the resulting input legitimacy of this policy (Heritier 2003, 108). Analogous one can argue that because of rather weak participation, the input legitimacy of EES and consequently the contribution of EES to the input legitimacy of the EU is also fairly poor. 

Representation
The participatory potential of OMC and EES refers to the representation of the citizens concerns by social partners, the regional and local governments, rather than direct citizens participation. But are all citizens concerns represented during the EES? We already discussed the fairly meagre participation of European and national social partners. Consequently, it can be doubted if the employers and employees concerns are all that well represented during the preparation and implementation of the NAP.

Besides the representation of the social partners, also the ‘democratic’ representation can be called in question. Hardly any parliament, either European, national or regional is involved during the NAP preparation (Zeitlin, Pochet et al. forthcoming 2005) which are important actors for the ‘democratic’  representation of the citizens concerns during elaborating and implementing NAP. In addition, the democratic appointed representatives of the Member States only formally authorise OMC and EES guidelines in the European Council and the sectoral formations of the Council, but most of the actual work is done by unelected committees (EMCO) composed of national civil servants and EU officials, whose decisions are rarely overturned (Zeitlin, Pochet et al. forthcoming 2005).  Also at the national level, the NAP preparation has been typically dominated by bureaucratic insiders. Therefore Smismans brands OMC and EES as no more than transgovernmental exchanges between national civil servants and EU officials (Smismans 2004), which is no clear-cut guarantee for the representation of the citizens concerns. 

Any attempts to explicitly include civil society during EES or to strengthen the involvement of regional and local actors in the Commission’s proposals for new Employment Guidelines in 2003, were watered down by national representatives within the EMCO in name of subsidiarity  (Radaelli 2003, 40). In fact the representation of the interests of all concerned actors was hereby weakened.

Representation is closely linked to participation. Therefore the fairly weak participation of social, regional and local actors in the EES has a negative effect on the representation of the interests of the concerned actors. A low representation level has also a negative effect on the input legitimacy, since that way the decision-making is not necessarily based on the interests of the affected actors.

Transparency
Also the improvement of  transparency is an aim of the OMC process. We will examine whether EES has contributed to (1) the transparency of information and communication, (2) the transparency of the employment policy and (3) the clearness and transparency of the decision-making process.  

De la Porte and Nanz have made an analysis of the transparency of information on EES at the EU level. They state that access to information and key documents regarding EES has improved considerably since March 2003 with the creation of a website dedicated specifically to EES (de la Porte and Nanz 2004). Prior to the creation of the website, information was available all over the website of the DG Employment, which made it difficult to gain clear information. The evaluation of the strategy in 2002 was initially secret, but the documents were ultimately made available for the larger public on the net, including specialised programmes on the exchange of experiences, midterm reviews and expert reports (de la Porte and Nanz 2004, 276-277) thus transparency of documents and information with regard to EES has been largely improved.

OMC and EES are supposed to stimulate a ‘learning process’ (Council of the European Union 2000, 6), so that exchange of best practices and visions lead to a more open and transparent approach of national employment policy. It is argued that the peer reviews and yearly evaluation mechanisms (NAP are discussed and made public) lead to the transparency of the employment policy and to opportunities for public debate. However public debate on employment policy evolving from the EES process is very weak (de la Porte and Nanz 2004, 277) and for citizens it  remains vague whether employment measures result from EES agreements or from national initiatives. Perhaps EES has created more transparency with regard to employment policy for the social partners, for the citizens it has not necessarily become more simple and transparent.

Also with regard to the decision-making process transparency has not improved. EES and OMC have introduced new decision-making mechanisms, which fluctuate between the prevailing supranational and intergovernmental procedures. This can lead to confusion in grasping the decision-making procedure. The Commission and the Council are empowered to issue joint recommendations to Member States on the implementation of the EES and the BEPG, but not on that of other OMC processes, while consultation of the EP is formally required only in the case of EES. (Zeitlin 2005). In addition, the deliberation of the committees who draft the EES guidelines, objectives and recommendations, takes place behind closed doors and remains far from transparent (Zeitlin, Pochet et al. forthcoming 2005). Information on the meetings is difficult to gain (de la Porte and Nanz 2004) and the learning process within the committees doesn’t sufficiently find its way beyond the conference room. Consequently only bureaucrats, politicians and experts gain an insight in best practices of national employment processes (Radaelli 2003, 50). Finally, introducing more actors and consequently more interests hasn’t improved the transparency of the process either since there is a greater complexity in compromises and in the decision-making processes. (Goetschy 2003, 78). 

Thus the overall assessment of the transparency criterion is rather ambiguous. With regard to the access to documents and information of EES, transparency has been largely improved, but with regard to the clearness of the decision-making procedure and of the employment policy transparency has not been increased. Based on empirical research, de la Porte and Nanz have argued that the contribution of the criterion ‘transparency’ to the input legitimacy of the EU is medium (de la Porte and Nanz 2004, 276). 

Accountability
How accountable are the actors within OMC and EES? Accountability is only implicitly suggested in OMC through the mention of ‘democratic participation’ which assumes that organised civil society and social partners as well as European and national parliaments give voice to the concerns of affected citizens in the decision-making process (de la Porte and Nanz 2004, 273) . However accountability is an important aspect of input legitimacy, stating that actors can be held responsible, accountable for their actions. Radaelli argues that there is no clear demarcation between decision-making and implementation within the OMC process, which makes the process susceptible to problems of judicial and political accountability (Radaelli 2003). With regard to the judicial accountability,  the European Court of Justice is not implicated in OMC, nor for the definition of the initiative nor for the implementation or practical application of NAP (de la Porte and Pochet 2002, 46; Radaelli 2003). As for political accountability, we already discussed the problematic issue of participation and representation of the social partners and the democratic actors like the European and national parliaments.. It seems that the new OMC procedure has reshuffled the conventional balance of power between EU institutions, which raises an important control and accountability question (Borras and Jacobsson 2004, 199). As a network of (closed) networks, EES tends to resist any type of accountability: management by objectives and procedural routines tends to remove decisions from electoral cycles (Ferrera, Hemerijck et al. 2000, 84). And since employment is a largely redistributive issue, input legitimacy from an accountability perspective can only be accomplished if democratic appointed actors take decisions and not technocratic, bureaucratic networks (Majone 1996)

Rodriguez states that OMC enhances accountability, because by opening the decision-making process to input from civil society and sub-national actors and national governments must justify their performance in meeting common European objectives to a broader public (Rodriguez 2001; Telo 2003). But this presumed accountability can also be contested. Since EES constitutes in voluntary agreements, no hard sanctions can be imposed when Member States don’t live up to the employment guidelines and recommendations. De la Porte and Pochet noted that ‘(…) because it is open, it also leaves the possibility for everyone to not engage at all’  (de la Porte and Pochet 2002, 296). Therefore the accountability of the deficient actors involved can be questioned. Some authors argue that EES and OMC in general can bee seen as a threat for the ‘accountable’ Community Method, a ‘soft’ law option which may overrule the hard law (Goetschy 2003; Trubek 2005). However, other authors argue that the ‘naming, shaming and blaming’ mechanisms, included in the ‘soft’ EES process by annual peer review and discussions, create a pressure on Member States to meet their agreements. That way the Member States can be held accountable in a ‘soft’ way (Goetschy 2003, 77; Zeitlin forthcoming 2005)

The question of accountability is a Damocles’ sword hanging over EES and OMC (Radaelli 2003, 50), and is an important minus for  input legitimacy. After all, if accountability is contested, the legitimacy of the actors involved is jeopardised. 

Delegation
Another criterion to assess the contribution of OMC and EES to input legitimacy of the EU is the delegation criterion. Is it legitimate that the power with regard to employment policy, which is a strictly national competence, is delegated to the European level? In other words is the EES a violation of the subsidiarity principle? OMC and EES are sometimes seen as a Trojan horse, allowing the EU to encroach on policy domains which are national competences. In addition, decisions in areas like employment have always been reached through a delicate process of mediation between interests within a country, which can not be reconstructed at the EU level. Therefore the risk occurs that employment guidelines, issued by ‘Brussels’, which call for unpopular or controversial reforms are considered to be unacceptable (Chassard 2001) Borras and Jacobsson argue that OMC does not involve any further transference of competences from the national to the EU level, but OMC has however uploaded the task of defining collective goals to the EU arena. Therefore OMC can be considered as a partial delegation of power (Wallace 2001, 592; Borras and Jacobsson 2004, 197). De la Porte and Nanz however nuance that the upwards delegation of power from the Member States to the Commission is marginal and limited to selected spheres (e.g. in case of BEPG and EES) (de la Porte and Pochet 2002). Hodson and Maher even argue that OMC can be seen as a radicalisation of subsidiarity, which implies a deliberately highly decentralised method (Hodson and Maher 2001). So, in formal terms the division of power between the EU and the Member States with regard to employment policy remains unchanged, but in practice some important decisions are taken at the EU level. A great merit of the EES is that it allows several crucial dimensions of the national employment modernisation agendas to be included within the EU agenda. Through the voluntary agreements policies about sensitive national issues can be designed at the EU level, which could not be accomplished within the traditional ‘Community method’. It also opens a new chapter in the discussion on realistic ways of reforming the European social model. (Telo, 2003, 137) OMC leads to spreading best practices and achieving greater convergence towards main EU goals. 

The transfer of defining goals in employment policy to the EU level is motivated by the arrear of the ‘social EU’, by the spill-over effects of the European economic policy on the national employment policy and by the growing incapability of Member States to solve the employment problems single-handed (Goetschy 2003; Scharpf 2003). In terms of the political transaction costs theory (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999), Member States considered it to be opportune to delegate the defining of employment goals to the EU level. The delegation of powers to the EMCO can be framed in the principal agents theory, stating that the national civil servants and EU officials in the EMCO have substantial expertise and knowledge on employment policy to concretise the guidelines, recommendations, etc within the EES. 

However, the subsidiarity principle, flanked with the proportionality principle, is important to consider delegation of power and competences to the EU level legitimate. The EES is a very delicate exercise in subsidiarity. On the one hand, as stated above, Member States considered it to be more effective to define general goals of employment policy at the EU level than at the national, regional or local level. It consists however in a very limited transfer, which is an answer to the proportionality principle. On the other hand the subsidiarity principle is also widely respected since the main competences and powers remain with the Member States: drawing and implementation of NAP happens at the national level, national diversity in approaching EES is widely accepted and European institutions as the EC, EP and the ECJ have very limited competences. This leaves the Member States to be the key actors in employment policy, a competence which is generally regarded to be decided upon close to the citizens, allowing national and even regional diversity.

The delegation criterion has contributed to the input legitimacy since it has kept midway between the necessity to delegate to the EU level because of shortcoming national employment policy and the safeguarding of national power and competences. 

Deliberation
Deliberation contributes to input legitimacy since the interest of the actors are taken into consideration during the decision-making. The way of deliberation (majority voting vs consensus) and the participation during deliberation (direct vs indirect involvement, polyarchy vs technocratic, etc.) (Cohen and Sabel 2003) all affect the extent of input legitimacy. 

OMC and EES imply voluntary agreements and emphasis lays on the importance of national diversity and characteristics. Consequently the decision-making procedure of EES is based on deliberation and negotiation in order to establish a consensus among participants. Consensual decision-making secures that minority interests cannot be overruled and that diverse interests are taken into account. By contrast if a majority decision is taken, the will of the majority can be imposed upon the minority (Scharpf 1999), which should violate the open and voluntary character of EES. According to Scharpf, the consensus-seeking deliberation is a guarantee for input legitimacy. . 

According to the deliberative theories described above, EES refers most to the directly deliberative polyarchy (Cohen and Sabel 2003) in which social partners and other stakeholders as local and regional governments can directly participate in the deliberation. Also Joerges’ model of deliberative supranationalism is relevant to grasp the deliberation within the closed expert committees composed of national civil servants and EU officials. Although Joerges is supportive of deliberative supranationalism with regard to the Comitology procedure, he doesn’t see it as an adequate model for political sensitive issues as employment policy (Joerges and Everson 2004) Contrastingly, Habermas’ deliberative democracy model can not be applied to EES since citizens and stakeholders cannot translate their concerns through public debate, and thus indirectly participating to the deliberation. Participation in EES is direct and in addition, public debate is mostly absent with regard to EES. 

Deliberation is an important aspect of the EES procedure, since it leads to the creation of an ‘epistemic community’ (Haas 1992), encouraging learning processes, convergence and confidence building. Globally assessing the EES with regard to the deliberation criterion, we can state that the consensus-driven deliberation within the EES process is a guarantee for input legitimacy, since the interests of all participants have to be taken into account and can not be overruled by a (hostile) majority (Scharpf 1999).

Conclusion
Has OMC the potential to be considered through its input side? We argue that it does, because, it encloses all criteria which can contribute to input legitimacy. In addition, in comparison with the more traditional decision-making at the EU level, OMC can possibly raise the overall input legitimacy of the EU through more participation of a diversity of public and private actors during decision-making and implementation, through better representation of the interests of the affected actors, through transparency of decision-making processes, information and documents, through accountability of the multitude of involved actors, through the delegation of the necessary competences to the EU level but at the same time the focus on national powers and competences and finally through consensus-driven deliberation which is a guarantee for minorities to not be overruled. 

In practice however, assessing EES, we see that input legitimacy is contested, especially when looking at the participation, representation, transparency and accountability criteria. Zeitlin concludes in his book that the ‘EES is widely regarded as a narrow, opaque and technocratic process involving high domestic civil servants and EU officials in closed policy networks, rather than a broad, transparent process of public deliberation and decision-making, open to the participation of all those with a stake in the outcome’ (Zeitlin, Pochet et al. forthcoming 2005). Thus, EES encounters some teething troubles but in the future can prove to be a valuable governance instrument with a broad input legitimacy. If it indeed realises it theoretical promises of input legitimacy it can as well contribute to the overall input legitimacy of the EU. 

EES and output legitimacy

The potential of OMC to increase input legitimacy (e.g. by introducing more participants in EU decision-making) was an important asset when introducing of OMC in the Lisbon Conclusions, but it can not be neglected that OMC was mainly prompted by output motivation, namely becoming ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustaining economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (Lisbon Conclusions). In other words to asses the legitimacy of EES, also output legitimacy must be taken into account. The EES’ goal is to reduce unemployment by affecting policies and programs at the national level. To assess its contribution to output legitimacy two questions can be asked: has EES played a role in changing policies (problem-solving capacity) and have changed policies reduced unemployment (effectiveness). 

Effectiveness
To assess the effectiveness of the EES, we take a look at the accomplishments of EES in the four pillars in employment policy it represents: employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities. Goetschy has done so and this were her conclusions. With regard to employability there has been a clear progress in the implementation of active and preventive policies: 14 Member States are already meeting the 20% target for the unemployed in active measures. However 5 Member States have not met the so-called quantitative targets of reducing youth and long-term unemployment due to insufficient measures taken. Half of the Member States have introduced global strategies for promoting long-time learning and promoting education, wile very little has been achieved in terms of prolong working life among persons aged between 55 and 64 (Goetschy 2003, 66). The entrepreneurship has been promoted in the Member States by a wide array of measures to reduce administrative and legal burdens for small and medium sized entrepreneurship as well as to favour local development and the social economy. But reducing tax burdens on labour has been to slow and concerns essentially low wage and low-skill work. The evaluation reports of EES stress the difficulty of launching a real entrepreneurship culture within the EU (Goetschy 2003, 66) For adaptability there is progress in more flexible working time arrangements and more flexible forms of working contracts. But there is not much improvement concerning new organisational issues and to quality of work and employment. Finally, with regard to the equal opportunities, the efforts to reduce inequalities between men and women at work differ considerably between Member States. Three areas are not enough addressed wage differences, childcare facilities and women’s role in decision-making. (Goetschy 2003, 67) More attention has been given to employability and entrepreneurship than to adaptability and equal opportunities. (Jacobsson 2002, 71). In addition, the EES does not embrace all policies that affect employment. Important areas such as monetary, fiscal and wage policy that critically affect growth and job creation in the EU are outside the scope of the strategy. The EES had to develop largely as a supply side strategy focussing on altering structural impediments to employment. (Trubek 2003, 41)

Effectiveness of EES is largely affected by its ‘soft governance’ (Jacobsson) characteristics. Since there are no ‘hard’ sanctions to ensure compliance by the Member States to the guidelines and NAPS’s, ‘soft’ measures like evaluation, peer review and naming-and-shaming-mechanisms must encourage Member States to implement and comply with the agreed guidelines. Scholars tend to have different opinions on the ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ characteristics of EES and on its consequences for the effectiveness of EES. On the one hand, the ‘softness’ of EES is contested by scholars who believe that the soft law mechanism makes it more likely for Member States to comply because the diverse domestic systems can not be steered with rigid harmonisation instruments (Goetschy 2003, 77; Trubek 2003, 39). There is evidence that soft measures like peer pressure and associated practices like recommendations and ranking (naming, shaming and blaming) do have influence on the behaviour of Member State governments. They do feel pressure to reach common targets and carry out agreed commitments. They want to avoid EU recommendations and low ranking as an embarrassment in domestic and EU politics (Zeitlin forthcoming 2005). That way these measures are not that ‘soft’. On the other hand, criticisms state that the benefits of OMC depend crucially on the willingness of the national actors who are in fact in control of policy choices to get themselves involved in processes of European coordination (Scharpf, 2003, 118). Therefore they plead to combine OMC with the capacity to impose binding sanctions (Heritier 2003; Scharpf 2003; Scharpf 2003). Also Dehousse argues that soft mechanisms of the EES are not sufficient when convergence of national employment policies is imperative and thus more ‘hard’ measures should be introduced (Dehousse 2002). The adoption of guidelines is more facile in case of ‘soft’ mechanisms, however the implementation of the guidelines is more difficult because the monitoring and follow up must compensate the weak legal density of the guidelines.(Goetschy 2003, 77)

Further, it is argued that effectiveness is enhanced by the participation of lots of actors, since they bear the implementation costs of a political decision (Zeitlin 2002; Heritier 2003; Radaelli 2003). The fact that they participate in the EES, formulating policy goals as well as choosing instruments to reach these goals, will cause them to support politically a policy measure that they might have opposed under the traditional legislative mode of governance. Thus, the fact that many actors are involved in the decision-making process helps to ensure compliance and thereby policy effectiveness (Börzel 2002). It is however discussed above that the participation of social and democratic elected actors is fairly weak during EES, which can lead to problematic implementation of NAP, since actors outvoted seek to recuperate their interests during the implementation phase; particularly when redistributive issues, like employment, are at stake (Heritier 2003, 112).

We see that EES has proven to be effective in some employment issues but that the theoretical promises of EES are not fully fulfilled. Some see the lack of effectiveness and substantive impact on Member States employment policy as a repackage of existing policies, more like ‘the emperors newest clothes’ (Radealli 2003, Scharpf 2002). However, the high hopes with regard to EES may not be confused with the expectation that EES would create overnight a consensus on the employment policy of the Member States. Although effectiveness is not that high, we have to acknowledge the fact that EES has come to some integration of Member States employment policies with Community level guidelines in a medium-term, multi-year perspective with incremental results. In addition, EES has drawn stability because the guidelines and recommendations remained fairly consistent over time (Goetschy 2003, 69-71). This could not have been realised through ‘hard’ and more traditional measures. Perhaps effectiveness would have been higher but the willingness of Member States to come to joint employment positions in the first place would be much more problematic or even non-existent. 

We can conclude that the effectiveness is an important criterion to evaluate output legitimacy. On the one hand, EES created employment policy which would otherwise not have been possible at EU level. However, the effectiveness of EES is not that high, which puts output legitimacy in perspective. 

Problem-solving capacity
Also the hopes on the problem-solving capacity were high in the begin stage of OMC: ‘consistent application of the Luxembourg exercise might lead to a convergence of Member States’ employment and labour policies, not dictated by Brussels but based on a growing consensus on effective solutions through a process of trial and error’ (Biagi 2000, 159). The problem-solving capacity of the EES is seen as policy learning about employment policy through information exchange, benchmarking and peer review, deliberation and blaming and shaming. That way, policy learning would create the frame of converging employment policies in which employment problems could be resolved. 

However, for now the hoped-for bottom-up and cross-country learning has been limited to problem-recognition rather than the actual adoption of foreign ‘best practice solutions, as for example lifelong learning, gender segregation and labour market integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities (Zeitlin forthcoming 2005). Due to poor participation of social actors and due to the safeguarding of the political power of the Member States, we see that the problem solving-capacity of EES is for the time being restricted to the convergence of ideas on employment policy across the Member States and hasn’t led yet to the adaptation of national employment policy (Radaelli 2003, 45). Instead it has led to selective borrowing and adapting of foreign programmes to the peculiarities of their own domestic context. However, in comparison to other OMC processes, there is evidence that in the EMCO the participants are willing to learn from each other and to alter visions on employment issues (de la Porte and Nanz 2004, 282). 

Also with regard to problem-solving capacity, the EES has much potential to come to policy learning about employment issues, because it constitutes in ‘a cognitive and normative tool for defining and building consensus in particular European social model’ (Vandenbroucke 2001), which has the capacity to encourage convergence of national objectives, performance and policy approaches and to come to identify and advancing the common concerns and interests of the Member States while simultaneously respecting their autonomy and diversity (de Burca and Zeitlin 2003). However, the mentality of Member States in this fairly new process has not changed enough to come yet to cross-national and bottom-up learning, which puts question marks with regard to the output legitimacy of EES.

Conclusion
Assessing OMC and EES with regard to output legitimacy is difficult and perhaps much more difficult than with regard to input legitimacy. It is problematic to distinguish to what extent national employment changes are really inspired by EES. Several factors should be taken into account. Firstly, the process is still recent and separation between effects of EES and effects of ongoing national policies is difficult (Goetschy 2003). Further, EES is not really external to national policy making, since a lot of indicators and notions are uploaded from the Member State level to the EU (Börzel 2002). That way the EU employment guidelines are a reflection of national employment policy and is the EES not an external catalyst to steer national policy. Finally, EES is not the only external effect on national employment policy. In a globalising world, other imperatives and guidelines can trigger domestic policy change (Zeitlin forthcoming 2005, 7)





OMC, a legitimate governance mode? OMC, a contribution to EU legitimacy?

This paper has offered a conceptual framework of several criteria to evaluate a governance procedure, OMC, for its input and output legitimacy.  Is OMC an answer to the legitimacy problems that the EU faces, or is it part of it? This question made us assess EES, as an example of OMC, with regard to input and output legitimacy. We came to the conclusion that EES has much potential to live up to both input and output legitimacy, but that the current EES process doesn’t meet these expectations yet. With regard to input legitimacy the hopes for more participation, transparency and representation than in the traditional Community Method are not fulfilled. In addition, the accountability criterion is even less guaranteed in the EES process than it would be in the traditional Community Method. On the other hand, delegation and deliberation criteria enhance input legitimacy, more than the Community method, by strictly respecting the subsidiarity principle and by guaranteeing consensus-driven deliberation. With regard to output legitimacy, effectiveness and problem-solving capacity are weakly assessed but nevertheless accomplishments were made that could not have been reached under the traditional Community method. 

Many authors have presented several reforms in order to maximise the potential of the OMC process (Zeitlin 2002; Heritier 2003; Radaelli 2003; Scharpf 2003). We hold back two suggestions. In ‘Opening the OMC’ Zeitlin advocates that the participation dimension of OMC must be applied in reality and even expanded to more actors (Zeitlin 2002). That way not only input legitimacy will be enhanced, but also output legitimacy, since those actors bear most of the implementation costs. A second suggestion is that OMC must be combined with legislative and contractual regulatory methods at the EU level (Heritier 2003; Scharpf 2003). After all, the willingness of Member States and actors to actually comply with decisions taken in OMC is crucial for its success as new governance mode. To circumvent the default-option but nevertheless to respect the non-binding character of OMC, a lot of scholars propose to make OMC complementary to the Community method. That way especially output legitimacy will be enhanced by promoting effectiveness and problem-solving capacity, but also input legitimacy since the accountability of negligent actors will be regulated.
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